Quote from: LaserSokrates on 2010-01-16 23:23:51

ABX is about whether you can notice the difference between two similar stimuli. It does not prove if two stimuli are the same. An ABX test determines the probability that you actually can make out the difference between the two. However, if the same ABX test is being done by a larger user group, certain assumptions can be made. It's all about statistics.

That's obviously a true statement, but I am not sure why this was posted as a reply to my comment. Unless you're trying to say that one can increase the probability of something being different by having an arbitrarily large group take part in the test, which is also true but also irrelevant.

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Anyway, I think both "camps" are applying common sense, and the only difference is what their common sense tells them

No, one camp uses scientific evidence within a certain, small range of uncertainty while the other camp is zealous about it's unfounded belief.

Actually it is literally true that both camps (here, I am not talking about magazine editors lying through their teeth for instance) are in fact using their common sense, and it is just that it's telling them different things. I do agree that it's much more reasonable to assume that results obtained by using samples of (for instance) 20s apply also to general music listening than not to, but that's because my commons sense tells me so (ie because I can "watch" myself listening to music and it seems that no integration occurs over such timescales, while also I've observed myself get fooled  by my hearing often enough to not trust subtle results indicating counterintuitive effects--the results would have to be compelling).

Anyway, you can't actually prove it except by induction, ie performing the experiments and showing that the same conclusion is reached. Given that I consider this generalisability to be obviously true, I won't bother  Or you could show that no mechanism exists that would result in long-term listening revealing features that cannot be noticed on short-term listening, but I don't think such an approach would work in this type of psychoacoustical research.

All I am saying is that in this particular case, it seems that Mark DeB is not doing this to defend his irrational beliefs but rather seems to actually be wondering about it. And if you think this is being stupid, that's fine, but I don't. I disagree with what he believes and think it's obviously incorrect, but that's all.

I also would not call your position truly sceptic, rather the opposite. You seem to just resort to a ultrasceptic position to sustain a non-sceptic belief (possibly induced by sighted comparison).

Right, no perceivable difference, but that isn't the same as no difference between perceptions.  If you listen to a one-minute stretch of music, and then a similar one-minute stretch, you might very well perceive different things, but not be able to detect and/or report this reliably because you  can't compare them.  And there is no need to assume that experience implies the ability to apply a label (such as "experienced effect").

• no perceivable A/B difference
• no perceivable side effect of A
• no perceivable side effect of B

Why are you insisting that we needlessly constrain ABX to a quick-switch situation?

Quote from: Mark DeB on 2010-01-17 01:16:25

Right, no perceivable difference, but that isn't the same as no difference between perceptions.  If you listen to a one-minute stretch of music, and then a similar one-minute stretch, you might very well perceive different things, but not be able to detect and/or report this reliably because you  can't compare them.  And there is no need to assume that experience implies the ability to apply a label (such as "experienced effect").

Ok, nice, let me summarize, then:

Subject S declares:

• no perceivable A/B difference
• no perceivable side effect of A
• no perceivable side effect of B

Why in hell should S then care about "hidden differences" in any scenario, where 1), 2), and 3) are true and are expected to stay true (else a long term ABX could give a definitive conclusion for S as it has been repeated here already many times). It is totally irrelevant wether real differences exist, for example if A has been low passed at 100000 Hz and B has been low passed at 100001 Hz. So why should S care?

Well, thank you for the vote of confidence, but what exactly is it that you take me to believe that you disagree with, or think is obviously incorrect?

I am saying that for all I know, those stimuli could have different causal properties, of a certain kind, that I care about.  Are you saying that the quick-switch ABX results furnish enough information to rule that out?  On what basis?  Yes, of course this is a question of science, or induction.  But you seem to be saying that you believe this because it is "reasonable," or "common sense," or on the basis of introspection perhaps, or "obviously true," none of which is scientific.

I think that you have put your finger on it when you say that it would have to be proved that "no mechanism exists."  What is more, there would have to be some theory of experiences and what it is for them to "reveal features," and of the causal conditions for such experiences.

I still think that, knowing what I know about how I did on the ABX test, it's an open question whether those signals could cause different types of experiences in me, perhaps in other settings such as longer-term listening.  The general tenor of the replies seems to have been that it is not an open question and that I should conclude that those signals could not do so.  But I think it would be rash to conclude that.  And no one here has stated any real scientific basis why that conclusion should follow.  Why, then, do you think I am "obviously incorrect" in not making said inference?

Because he doesn't assume that the only differences between experiences that matter are ones he is able to monitor and report on.

Quote from: rpp3po on 2010-01-16 23:33:40

I also would not call your position truly sceptic, rather the opposite. You seem to just resort to a ultrasceptic position to sustain a non-sceptic belief (possibly induced by sighted comparison).

I agree. Mark DeB, you're being "skeptical" about something, but completely credulous about something else for which there's no evidence (nor any clear physical or physiological mechanism through which it could credibly happen). Furthermore, you're inventing "maybes" to support your hypothesis. "Maybe there's something that no one can detect, but long-term will make you feel different." Well do you have any ideas as to what it might be? Put forward something clear so it can be tested. Anything that can be felt by your senses (and not invented by the brain), can be detected. Your body is full of detectors!

As for the long-term feeling stuff, it can also be ABX'ed as others already said. Just takes more time, but the procedure is the same. You just listen blindly for a long time, and if you believe it's the touchy-feely version, mark it on your chart. Rinse and repeat. What's the problem there?

Well, thank you for the vote of confidence, but what exactly is it that you take me to believe that you disagree with, or think is obviously incorrect?  I am saying that for all I know, those stimuli could have different causal properties, of a certain kind, that I care about.  Are you saying that the quick-switch ABX results furnish enough information to rule that out?  On what basis?  Yes, of course this is a question of science, or induction.  But you seem to be saying that you believe this because it is "reasonable," or "common sense," or on the basis of introspection perhaps, or "obviously true," none of which is scientific.

About long-term, my question is the same: if you can't tell a difference between the two signals, does it follow that they are not causing you to have different experiences (i.e., that you are not perceiving different things in them)?

About long-term, my question is the same: if you can't tell a difference between the two signals, does it follow that they are not causing you to have different experiences (i.e., that you are not perceiving different things in them)?

Quote from: Mark DeB on 2010-01-17 02:13:37

Well, thank you for the vote of confidence, but what exactly is it that you take me to believe that you disagree with, or think is obviously incorrect?

I think that your central point is that results from ABX-type tests with short pieces of music do not necessarily hold for long-term listening. In terms of logic this is true, and also if I just look at the "experiments" themselves, they literally say nothing about long-term listening, unless I make some assumptions about the "listening mechanism" in our heads. Apparently, given your assumptions about this mechanism, they do not, but according to mine they do.

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I am saying that for all I know, those stimuli could have different causal properties, of a certain kind, that I care about.  Are you saying that the quick-switch ABX results furnish enough information to rule that out?  On what basis?  Yes, of course this is a question of science, or induction.  But you seem to be saying that you believe this because it is "reasonable," or "common sense," or on the basis of introspection perhaps, or "obviously true," none of which is scientific.

I think that you have put your finger on it when you say that it would have to be proved that "no mechanism exists."  What is more, there would have to be some theory of experiences and what it is for them to "reveal features," and of the causal conditions for such experiences.

Right, like if I claim that the fact that the sun has risen from the east for millenia (let's just assume this) does not prove that it will tomorrow. It really doesn't. Coupled with the usual models of what is actually happening, though, and given that these models are in accord with other pieces of information (falling rocks, observed motion of other lights in the sky under the assumption they're planets etc), it's hard to not conclude that it will.

Here, neither side has the equivalent model (yes a lot is known but nothing as simple, general, accurate and reliable), so it's less certain.

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I still think that, knowing what I know about how I did on the ABX test, it's an open question whether those signals could cause different types of experiences in me, perhaps in other settings such as longer-term listening.  The general tenor of the replies seems to have been that it is not an open question and that I should conclude that those signals could not do so.  But I think it would be rash to conclude that.  And no one here has stated any real scientific basis why that conclusion should follow.  Why, then, do you think I am "obviously incorrect" in not making said inference?

Technically it is. I, however, am not aware of a single piece of evidence to support your thesis, nor any mechanism to suggest so. Obviously (again  ), this does not disprove it, but...

The "obviously" should probably have been quoted, as I meant it as shorthand for "in light of my mental model of the world, it would be really strange if it was not true that".

I don't think this kind of belief has the same status as believing the earth is flat, but I still would be quite surprised if it was true (as I said, lack of evidence, no personal experience indicating it etc).

Quote from: aclo on 2010-01-17 02:43:13

I don't think this kind of belief has the same status as believing the earth is flat, but I still would be quite surprised if it was true (as I said, lack of evidence, no personal experience indicating it etc).

The difference with the "earth is flat" hypothesis is that no one here has pointed to a theory of experiences, including criteria for when they are the same or different, and of their causal conditions, that would support said inference.  That is what is actually needed to meet the skeptical worry.  The skeptic is saying, "For all I know, there could be differences to perception, whatever that would mean, despite the negative ABX."  What is needed is a scientific basis on which the notions of experience and perception get sufficiently explicated and laws stated from which it follows that there really will be no difference to experience.

But the skeptical worry is a perfectly reasonable stage of the inquiry.  Without a theory, we don't know that there isn't such a difference.  If we don't know, it is right to point out that we don't know; or at least to ask on what basis we know.  But to answer this in terms of what is "strange," or "common sense," is just arm waving. It's not science.

Quote from: Mark DeB on 2010-01-17 02:52:19

About long-term, my question is the same: if you can't tell a difference between the two signals, does it follow that they are not causing you to have different experiences (i.e., that you are not perceiving different things in them)?

Your term of "can't tell a difference" is limited to direct, short-term comparison. My term of "no perceivable difference" is two sets of predicates attributed by S at/after the time of exposure to A and B, P(A) P(B) do not correlate to the actual succession of A and B. In that sense the question is decidable in regard to any chosen level of confidence for each subject.

...nor is the insistence that there are unidentifiable factors at play that will create an outcome that has never been reported science.

Quote from: greynol on 2010-01-17 03:26:48

...nor is the insistence that there are unidentifiable factors at play that will create an outcome that has never been reported science.

Your careful reading continues apace.  Nowhere have I insisted that there are such factors.  The question is, what rules them out in the present instance?  That would be nice to know.

But the skeptical worry is a perfectly reasonable stage of the inquiry.  Without a theory, we don't know that there isn't such a difference.  If we don't know, it is right to point out that we don't know; or at least to ask on what basis we know.  But to answer this in terms of what is "strange," or "common sense," is just arm waving. It's not science.

Quote from: Mark DeB on 2010-01-17 02:52:19

About long-term, my question is the same: if you can't tell a difference between the two signals, does it follow that they are not causing you to have different experiences (i.e., that you are not perceiving different things in them)?

If a subject is having "different experiences" then they should be able to "tell a difference." It might be hard; it might not be something that all subjects can do; the nature of the difference might not be verbalizable. It might be that some subjects, poorly presented with a DBT, might falsely gain the impression that they were not allowed to declare a difference if they could not locate and describe the nature of that difference; but that would be a poorly conducted DBT.

For any reasonable meaning of "experience," different experiences are detectable. There doubtless are processes in my body which vary, and which I will never be conscious of--for instance, moderate fluctuations in the flora in my gut. But that variation is not an experience, because it has no effect on my feeling of the world (large variations in flora, of course, could well be experiential). Other, normally unconscious processes, can be brought into consciousness; the state of one's peripheral circulation, for instance, is an experience because one can tell a difference ("Is it cold in here, or is it my circulation?"), even when one cannot name it. But remote unnameable possibilities are just not worth bothering about.

Fine, replace "insistence that there are" with "suggestion that there may be".  This does not change the irony of your post or your position.

Quote from: Mark DeB on 2010-01-17 03:21:04

But the skeptical worry is a perfectly reasonable stage of the inquiry.  Without a theory, we don't know that there isn't such a difference.  If we don't know, it is right to point out that we don't know; or at least to ask on what basis we know.  But to answer this in terms of what is "strange," or "common sense," is just arm waving. It's not science.

Without a theory, we don't know that there isn't an invisible, undetectable dragon living in my garage. Do you agree that we "don't know" that there's an invisible dragon living in my garage?

There is no reason whatsoever to assume that something outside of one's mind that can't be detected is influencing anyone, if there's no mechanism for it to affect him/her. Furthermore, the "phenomenom" is already easily explainable by far better known theories (placebo, etc.).

Settle down, chil'ren.

Mark, you are correct that under any strictly logical analysis, a negative ABX result cannot "debunk" the existence or non-existence of a difference. Nonexistence is nonfalsifiable. However, it can disprove the magnitude of such a difference, if it exists, and often times that's enough to settle a debate. If one says "OMG this is a night and day difference, I can detect the improvement in half a second", but then undergoes an ABX test under identical listening conditions and fails it miserably, the most plausible reason for the failure is not that there's some fundamental issue with ABX testing that fundamentally compromises its meaning (although that excuse is profferred all the time). The most plausible reason is that the originally perceived difference was 100% imaginary, and among many reasons why this is the most plausible, the one I prefer is that I observe that behavior in myself, regularly, in comparisons which plainly null out, and based on my experience and what I know of human psychology, I expect that behavior in everybody else.

However, when blind tests consistently fail, and there are good theoretical reasons to doubt that such tested differences would ever be audible, at some point, you've gotta step back and call a turd a turd. A while ago there was a big controlled study showing that homeopathy did not demonstrate any efficacy, and while that was used by doctors to "prove" that homeopathy was a worthless fraud, it clearly could not justify such a conclusion - and it didn't, at least not on its own. But combined with the knowledge that homeopathy treatments are diluted to the point of not containing a single molecule of the original substance, and the knowledge that no remotely scientifically plausible theory exists that would in any way justify its efficacy, even after over 100 years of study, you'd need some pretty thick blinders (or big cahones) to assert anything different than "homeopathy is dead".

In other words... bone up on your Kuhn. Paradigms have never been overturned because of evidence.

Regarding quick-switch, I might offer (anybody correct me if I'm wrong here): a) No evidence exists that long-time switching is any more sensitive than quick switching; b) Considerable anecdotal evidence (and I want to say at least one study) indicates quick switching being more sensitive than long time switching; c) The seconds-long duration of auditory memory provides an extremely powerful theoretical justification for the increased sensitivity of fast switching. There is simply no evidence supporting such a theoretical objection, some (perhaps a significant) amoung of evidence against the idea, and a very good theoretical reason against the idea.

RE: "For any reasonable meaning of "experience," different experiences are detectable."

That is just a dogmatic claim, armchair neuroscience.